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This paper simulates, within a partial equilibrium framework, the scenarios resulting 
form the implementation of several educational policies. Then, policies are compared 
according to their hypothetical results in terms of labor earnings inequality, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient. Results suggest that educational policies which 
attempt to guarantee medium qualification produce the lowest inequality even if 
dispersion in schooling years is high. Policies which attempt to raise tertiary education 
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En este trabajo se simulan, dentro de un marco de equilibrio parcial,  los escenarios 
que resultarían de la implementación de una serie de políticas educativas. Dichas 
políticas son comparadas a partir de sus efectos hipotéticos sobre la desigualdad en los 
ingresos laborales,  medidos a partir del coeficiente Gini. Los resultados indican que 
las políticas educativas que garantizan educación media universal producen la menor 
desigualdad. Políticas educativas en las que se aumenta la cobertura en educación 
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Educational policy affects the schooling years of individuals in a given society. 
Thus, it potentially has an effect on the distribution of labor earnings throughout the 
population. Nevertheless, Economic literature does not provide policy makers with 
means to predict these effects. This paper compares the results of a series of empirical 
exercises in which the scenarios, in terms of labor earnings inequality, that would 
emerge after the implementation of a set of plausible educational policies are predicted. 
All of the above is developed within a partial equilibrium framework, in which only 
labor earnings are affected by the educational policies. 
In order to simulate the effects of the different educational policies on the 
distribution of earnings, a methodology that has been widely used in decompositions of 
changes in earnings inequality (Bourgignon & Ferreira 2005) is applied. The 
educational policies are represented by the objective distribution of schooling years 
across the population associated with each one of them. The main advantage of this 
methodology is that it allows identifying and isolating the effect of each distribution of 
schooling years on the distribution of earnings, conditional on the distribution of other 
individual characteristics correlated with earnings and the prices of those characteristics. 
The estimated prices for 2004 are used. 
Several conclusions arise from the described exercises. First, guaranteeing medium 
qualification (high school) appears to be a powerful and necessary way of achieving 
lower inequality. Educational policies which attempt to raise average schooling years or 
tertiary educational coverage but do not start with full high school coverage are not 
efficient at lowering labor earnings inequality. Also, composition of the schooling 
distribution, and not only its variance, proves to be of great importance when relating it 
to the labor earnings distribution.  Thus, the results suggest the possibility of achieving 
scenarios in which a high variability in schooling years coexists with low earnings 
inequality. In particular, an ambitious schooling distribution
1 in which high school is 
guaranteed and half of the labor force has a college education, generates good results in 
terms of earnings inequality without making sacrifices in terms of earnings level, at the 
same time that it is has a relatively high dispersion of schooling years. Finally, since 
some of the educational policies included are nested within other of these policies, a 
very general analysis can be made about two different paths towards a schooling 
distribution with a higher proportion of high skilled labor.  
 
2   Labor Earnings Inequality and the Educational Expansion 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of labor earnings inequality, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, during the period 1980-2003 in Colombia. Just as it has been widely 
documented by economic literature, inequality rose systematically since the end of the 
1980’s. At the same time, average years of schooling went from about 6.5 in 1982 to 
slightly above 8 in 2000 (Figure 2). During this same period, the standard deviation 
increased as well. The coefficient of variation fell to about 0.52, though (almost 0.05 
less than it was ten years before). Nevertheless, these changes cannot fully acknowledge 
relevant variations in the composition of the schooling distribution. As Figure 3 shows, 
                                                 
1 This distribution is based on the goals included in the Colombian “Plan Decenal de Educación 2006-
2015” (Decennial Educational Plan 2006-2015)   4
the outstanding growth in the proportion of people with high school or more was mainly 
driven by the increase in the percentage of the population who completed high school 
but has no tertiary education, and complemented, although not so strongly, by those 
with some tertiary education and the decrease of the relative size of those with no 
schooling. 
Figure 1.
































































































































































Source: DNP and author's calculations based on ECH and ENH 
Figure 2. 


























Source: Author's calculations based on ENH   5
Figure 3.











1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
%
None Some highschool Some college Complete college Highschool but no colllege
 
Source: Author's calculations based on ENH 
 
Thus, one could expect that the particular composition of the schooling distribution 
would affect the earnings distribution. In other words, it is definitively important to take 
into account the exact way in which schooling is distributed, and not only the variance 
of this distribution, in order to understand the relationship between education and 
economic inequality. Clearly, the observed changes in the Gini coefficient ought not to 
be explained only by the changes in the schooling distribution. Nevertheless, a great 
deal of the variation in labor earnings seems to be determined by the dispersion in the 
schooling of individuals. Cárdenas and Bernal (1999) have shown that, in 1996, 36% of 
the earnings inequality could be explained by schooling alone
2. Furthermore, in a 
hypothetical scenario in which all individuals had identical observed characteristics and, 
therefore, the variance in their labor earnings was solely due to unobserved 
characteristics and stochastic shocks, the estimated Gini coefficient would be 0.173. If 
schooling was allowed to vary too, the Gini coefficient would climb to 0.346, 
accounting for approximately 35% of observed inequality. Compared to this, potential 
experience (the other individual characteristic measuring human capital accumulation) 
would account for just 10% of inequality. 
Thus, understanding the connection that has been discussed becomes fundamental 
for the analysis of the determinants of the behavior of earnings inequality during the last 
decades, as well as in the attempt of designing equality enhancing public policies. The 
former has been developed through different empirical strategies (Núñez and Sánchez, 
1998b; Cárdenas and Bernal, 1999; Santa María, 2004; Vélez, Leibovich, Kugler, 
Bouillon and Núñez, 2005). This work intends to contribute in the latter. 
 
3 Labor Earnings Distribution, Educational Policy, and the 
Schooling Distribution. 
  
Educational policy can be a very ambiguous term and, so far, it has been used in this 
paper without giving any clear and precise definition. Even though educational policy 
includes a great variety of actions, goals, perspectives, etc., it will be used here to refer, 
exclusively, to the precise goals in terms of enrollment in the different schooling levels 
and the means for achieving those goals. Therefore, it will make no reference to any 
                                                 
2 The proportion was 27% only 8 years before.   6
other dimensions of educational policy, such as quality, ideology, curriculum, or any 
other element that may be included in a broader definition. Thus, it is a conceptual and 
terminological simplification. 
Within this particular and narrowed dimension of educational policy, it is reasonable 
to think about the goals of policy makers in terms of an objective schooling distribution 
within the relevant age range. For example, when someone talks about universal 
coverage in basic education (Colombian 9
th grade), she might be thinking about a 
schooling distribution in which all of the individuals have, at least, 9 years of schooling. 
Based on the above, one of the main assumptions supporting the work developed in this 
paper is that different educational policies can be represented by their corresponding 
objective schooling distribution, which is, according to what has been stated, a plausible 
assumption. 
Thus, the basic concern underlying this paper is that of the relationship between 
schooling and labor earnings distributions, understanding the former as the plausible 
representation of the goals of given educational policies. In particular, it is worth asking 
oneself about what kind of schooling distributions would be associated with less 
unequal earnings distributions. If there exists at least a partial answer to this question, a 
connection between the schooling distributions and the particular educational policies 
they attempt to represent could be posed. Based on this connection, useful criteria for 





All of the estimations in this paper are based on the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 
and the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (Household survey)
3 for the stages 
corresponding to the third quarter of 1985, 1995 and 2004. Information on individual 
years of schooling (used also for the construction of level premia); age (used in the 
construction of potential experience
4); occupation (construction workers, employees, 
domestic service employees, self employed, business owners and other earners); 
metropolitan area of residence (Bogotá, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Medellín, 
Manizales, Cali and Pasto); marital status (cohabiting, married, widowed, single, 
separated/divorced); household size (in terms of household members and household 
members under 10); relationship with the head of household; and individual labor 
earnings is used.. 
 
The sample has been restricted based on several criteria. First, only data from people 
living in the 7 largest cities is included. This is done to assure comparability between 
samples for the different stages of the survey. People reporting more than 84 hours 
worked during the previous week are excluded
5 too, in order to reduce probable 
measurement error. Finally, with that same purpose, observations in the top and bottom 
1% of the labor earnings distribution are excluded as well. As a result of all of the 
above, the sample size for the estimation of the earnings functions is 47,179, where 
23,199 of those observations are reported earners (2004 sample)
 6. 
 
                                                 
3 DANE. 
4Potential experience =Age-schooling – 6. 
5 Note that 84 hours a week is 12 hours a day x 7 days a week.  
6This numbers are 12,001,999 and 6,120,098, respectively, when observations are properly weighted.    7
5   Literature Review: a Selection 
 
The following literature review is focused on three subjects: work attempting to 
explain the rise in inequality during the 1980’s and 1990’s in countries other than 
Colombia (mainly U.S.A.); in Colombia; and research that includes some prediction of 
the effects of educational policy. This kind of literature is, to say the least, abundant. 
Thus, this review is not intended to be exhaustive. Quite the opposite, the idea is to set 
some relevant examples, as well as to introduce fundamental findings and conclusions 
of some seminal papers. 
 
The observed rise in inequality during the 1980’s and 1990’s triggered, in many 
countries, a proliferation of economic literature which tried to explain the determinants 
of such a change in the trend. For example, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) found that 
a great deal of this phenomenon could be explained by changes in the unobserved 
components (attributed to unobserved ability) of wages, and by the different timing of 
these and the changes in observables. The American rise in inequality of the 1980’s 
would be owed to an increase in the wages of high skilled workers (returns to observed 
ability), as well as an increase in the returns to unobserved ability. 
Katz and Murphy (1992) argued that, besides the growing demand for skilled 
workers, unobserved ability and female labor, one of the main determinants of the 
changes in the American wage structure between 1963 and 1987 was the dynamics in 
the relative supply of skilled labor. DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) added 
institutional and normative components to the explanation (i.e. changes in the union 
structure) and proposed the behavior of the minimum wage as another basic 
determinant. Mincer (1996) found that the within educational group inequality was the 
largest contributor to overall inequality, once other variables are controlled for. 
Following Juhn et. al. (1993), he identifies these changes with rising returns to 
unobserved ability, which would be due to technological dynamics. 
Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998) analyze the changes in earnings inequality in the 
U. S and Canada, and attempt to relate them with technological change. They find that 
the behavior of inequality can be explained by changes in relative supply of skilled 
labor and changes in technology which raise the demand for unobserved ability. 
According to them, the rise in inequality would have been stronger in the Canadian case 
if there had not been a progressive equalization in the supply of differently skilled kinds 
of labor. Beaudry and Green (2000) try to explain the Canadian case with a totally 
different set of arguments, based on the hypothesis of a systematic deterioration of labor 
market conditions. They conclude that younger cohorts face a lower earnings profile 
than older ones throughout their entire lifetime.  
Finally, Johnson (1997) finds that the relative demand for skilled worked has 
followed a rising trend since the 1940’s, which experienced an important acceleration 
starting at the beginning of the 1980’s. The same did not happen with the relative 
supply, which lagged during this last period. From this point of view, the rise in 
earnings inequality comes from these different dynamics in relative supply and demand. 
Although several explanations could be posed, the rise in unobserved ability due to 
technological change seems to be the most reasonable to the author. 
 
Colombia was not an exception to the rising inequality trend (as it was shown in 
Figure 1) and a vast economic literature has been produced on the subject. Núñez and 
Sánchez have exhaustively documented changes in the Colombian wage structure   8
(1998a), the determinants of changes in labor earnings inequality (1998b) and the 
changes in the decisions of Colombian households (2002) during the 1990’s. Generally 
speaking, they find robust and consistent evidence of the importance of education in all 
of these processes, especially through the observed changes in relative prices and 
supply. According to them (1998b), schooling alone can explain 20% to 30% of the 
variation in inequality. They observe differential dynamics between male and female 
labor prices too. Besides that, within sector mobility and the deterioration of overall 
labor market conditions are found to be powerful and fundamental components of the 
observed changes in inequality. 
According to Santa María (2004), the recent Colombian labor market conditions can 
be characterized by decreasing returns to intermediate skilled workers and increasing 
relative wages of women and skilled workers. He rejects the hypothesis of a relationship 
of these and the structural reforms that took place in Colombia at the beginning of the 
1990’s (openness and trade liberalization). The explanation could be found, he 
concludes, in the variations of the skill composition of the labor force and skilled bias 
technological change. 
Vélez et al. (2005) make a decomposition of the observed changes in inequality, 
based on the same methodology used later on this paper (Bourguignon & Ferreira, 
2005). Based on their estimations, they classify determinants as persistent and 
fluctuating forces. The first group includes, on the one hand, socio-demographic 
conditions such as the schooling distribution, which are the result of long term trends. 
The fluctuating determinants include, on the other hand, some of the most important 
determinants (i.e. the rising returns to skill) which, nonetheless, obey to transitory 
conditions. Generally speaking, their results agree with what had been found by Núñez 
and Sánchez (1998a, 1998b, 2002). But besides all of these, and contrary to their 
expectations, they find that the equalization of educational endowments led to a 
deterioration of the income distribution in urban areas (Vélez et. al. 2005:127). 
 
Taking a different methodological perspective, in recent years, technological 
innovation has allowed the full estimation of structural models in diverse fields 
including labor economics. These estimations include, in many cases, the simulation of 
the effects of particular public policies in a specific framework. There is no intention 
here to survey this literature. On the contrary, just a couple of examples of public policy 
simulations are set. They are completely different in nature to the ones developed later 
on, though.  
Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate a model of schooling, labor force participation 
and occupational choices. Based on it, they evaluate, for example, the consequences of 
introducing college subsidies. Keane and Wolpin (2001) ask themselves about the 
effects of liquidity constraints and parental transfers on the decisions of human capital 
investments and labor market choices. They simulate scenarios which include subsidies, 
relaxing the constraints and equalizing parental transfers. They find, among other 
things, that liquidity constrains are not as important as parental transfers in the 
determination of the decisions mentioned above. Both of these works, as most of the 
literature does, evaluate only partial equilibrium effects of the public policies. 
Opposite to this literature, this paper develops some empirical exercises based on 
reduced form models instead of structural models. The data available in Colombia does 
not allow doing something of that type. Despite this restriction, the greatest advantage 
of the methodology used here is that it allows the evaluation, in a rigorous manner, of 
the partial equilibrium effects and consequences of educational policies which cannot be 




6.1 Baseline Methodology  
 
The methodology proposed by Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005) is basically one 
designed for decompositions of changes in earnings distributions between two periods. 
The first step
7 is to estimate a conditional earnings function for different moments in 
time. The assumption here is that individual earnings are correlated with other observed 
characteristics such as schooling, experience, gender, marital status, etc.; the market 
prices of those characteristics; and an error term including unobserved characteristics 
and stochastic shocks. Thus, the following can be written: 
 
{} ) , , ( t t t
t
i D y θ χ Π =                                                (1)                             
where  {}
t
i y  are the observed labor earnings in time  t, and  t χ ,  t θ ,  t Π  are the 
distribution of the observed characteristics, the prices of those characteristics  and the 
distribution of the error term in time t. In the particular case of individual labor 
earnings, the distribution  ) , , ( t t t D θ χ Π  can be easily estimated through a Mincer 
equation, which can be expressed this way:  
i i i X y ε θ α + + = ln . 
Accordingly, the function generating distribution D( ) would be: 
F(X, ) ,ε θ = R ) exp( ε θ + X .
8                                   (2)  
The next step is to define the counterfactuals in the way Bourguignon and Ferreira 
do. The changes needed in order to simulate the effects of educational policies will be 
shown later. 
Knowing X for two given moments in time t and s, F(  ) can be estimated for these 
two cross sections. In this paper, this estimation includes the correction of selection bias 










s s s s X F ε θ                          (3a ,3b) 
The counterfactuals are obtained by simply simulating the earnings distribution after 
substituting the elements of F( ) from t to s or vice versa. For example, the 
counterfactual 
{} ) ~ , ~ , ( s t t
s t
i D y θ χ Π =
→                                            (4) 
could be created, in which an earnings distribution is simulated using the observed 
characteristics in t, the estimated distribution of residuals for that same period, but the 
prices of s. This counterfactual can be interpreted as the earnings that individuals with 
the characteristics of t would have had if the prices would have been those of s. Since 
what it is generated through the simulation process is a distribution, inequality measures 
can be estimated on the counterfactual. 
                                                 
7 Even though the methodology is proposed and applied in more general terms, it is introduced in the 
specific way that it operates on this paper. 
8This specification comes from a standard income equation i i H R y . = , in which R is the rental price of 
Human Capital and  i H  is the individual stock of HC. In particular,  ) exp( ε θ + = i i X H  and 
R ln = α .   10
A possible extension of this process is to do these exercises with hypothetical X 
distributions which do not necessarily come from observed data. This procedure is 
different form the one proposed by Bourguignon and Ferreira because it does not intend 
to decompose changes in the distribution into changes in the elements of F ( ). 
Nevertheless, this methodological variation allows the prediction of the consequences of 
educational policies which can be represented through those hypothetical X 
distributions, even if these policies cannot be observed or proxied through actually 
observed data. 
 
6.2 Educational Policy Counterfactuals 
 
According to what was mentioned in the previous section, a counterfactual in which 
the distribution of X is created arbitrarily could be thought of. Specifically, artificial 
variations could be generated on the data included in t X  (the observed distribution of X 
in  t). Since  t X  is really a matrix in which each column is a particular variable or 
characteristic, the arbitrary Xs would leave all of those columns (variables) unaltered 
except the one containing the data on schooling (thus its distribution). Schooling data is 
changed in order to represent a specific educational policy. In this way, the 
counterfactual 
   {} ) ˆ , ˆ , ( t t c
t c
i D y θ χ Π =
→                                           (5) 
Is obtained, where  c χ  is the counterfactual distribution of X (only different from t X  in 
the schooling data),  t Π ˆ is the estimated distribution of the random term estimated in t, 
and  t θ ˆ  are the parameters estimated in that same year. 
Therefore, the comparative analysis is established on the different counterfactual 
distributions of labor earnings {}
t c
i y
→  which come from the different c χ distributions 
(the schooling distributions included in them) and their interaction with parameters t θ ~: 
 
{} ) ˆ , ˆ , ( t t c
t c
i D y θ χ Π =
→  
 Vs.  
{} ) ˆ , ˆ , ( t t h
t h
i D y θ χ Π =
→  
The comparison between two distributions {}
t c
i y
→  and {}
t h
i y
→  is based on any 
inequality measure (Gini coefficient, Theil’s entropy measure), which allows the 
distributions, and their corresponding educational policies, to be ranked according to the 
level of inequality they produce, taking the distribution of other characteristics, the 
estimated prices and the distribution of the error term as given. Formally, an earnings 











I could be any inequality measure. In this paper, it will be the Gini coefficient, although 
Theil’s entropy measure is also reported in the results. 
Since the only thing that makes {}
t c
i y
→ different from {}
t h
i y
→  is the schooling 
distribution in the generating process (other observed characteristics are identical, as 
well as the residuals), the above allows to conclude that if c is better than h, then  c X is   11
better than h X . This really means that schooling in  c X  is better than h X . Under the 
assumption that schooling in c and h are the representations of educational policies c 
and h¸ educational policy c is considered to be better than policy h. 
Finally, it is worth noting that any effect of the educational policies on the labor 
income distribution is conditioned on the other observed characteristics and their prices. 
About the former, the ones observed in 2004, which are the most recent ones available, 
are used. About the latter, the results are robust to the year in which they are estimated. 
 
6.3 Earnings and Participation Functions 
 
As it was mentioned on the previous section, the distribution of earnings, 
conditional on other characteristics can be easily estimated through a Mincer equation. 
Off course, there are other more sophisticated ways of estimating some of the elements 
included in a Mincer equation. Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006) have shown that the 
coefficients of schooling in this type of models cannot be interpreted as the internal 
return rate to schooling. Nevertheless, there is no interest here in estimating such thing. 
Human capital investments of individuals are not being modeled. Quite the opposite, the 
distribution of schooling is taken as exogenous, since it is the representation of some 
particular objectives in a given educational policy. Thus, the Mincer equation is just 
used as the conditional distribution of log labor earnings or, as it is stated by Peracchi 
(2006), the statistical function of labor earnings. 
According to this, the particular specification of the Mincer equation is: 
∑∑
==





















                         (6) 
which includes the individual’s schooling years, potential experience (in linear and 
quadratic forms), high school and college premia, and city, occupation and marital 
status fixed effects. 
The choice of the particular form for schooling in this equation (linear term plus two 
level premia) is owed to the assumption of discrete changes in earnings at these specific 
points of the schooling distribution. It is a standard specification in economic literature 
and a widely used one in Colombia (i.e. Núñez and Sánchez 1998a y 1998b). 
 This estimation has to be corrected for possible selection bias. This process is done 
through the Heckman method, where the Mincer equation is jointly estimated with the 
selection equation, in which the probability of participating is determined as follows: 
  
+ + + + = i i i i i college complete d schooling under members members household Part _ _ 10 _ _




m ead householdh ead householdh female tus maritalsta _
4
1
ϕ   
i i i parent hhincome spouse hhincome ε + + _ _                                                           (7) 
 
where female_householdhead is 1 if the household head for the individual’s household 
is a woman and 0 otherwise; householdhead is 1 if the individual is the head of his 
household and 0 otherwise; hhincome_spouse and hhincome_parent are the head of 
household’s income in case he/she is the spouse or the parent of the individual, 
respectively.    12
Since this selection equation is, in fact, a raw modeling of the decision of 
participating in the labor market, the effects of educational policies on it could be taken 
into account too. However, this would require assuming that all of the possible rises in 
participation rates due to higher overall schooling can be absorbed perfectly by the labor 
market. No need to be said, this is a very strong assumption and an unlikely thing to 
happen. As it is shown in Table 1, the difference in predicted occupation rates between 
some of the policies would be of more than 20 percentage points in some cases. This 
rules out this option almost automatically. Thus, baseline results are based on another 
assumption which is just as strong but less unlikely than this one. Participation 
decisions are assumed to remain unaltered by educational policies.  
Off course, the real scenario must be somewhere in between these two situations. 
Fortunately, relative results are identical when participation effects are and are not 
included in the simulations. Magnitudes are quite different, though. Therefore, results 
under both assumptions could be interpreted as lower and upper bounds for the size of 















There are several limitations to the kind of analysis described, which are owed to the 
characteristics of the methodology. First, it does not take into account any of the general 
equilibrium effects that could arise from the implementation of the educational policies 
evaluated. For instance, exogenously introduced changes in the schooling distribution 
could affect its price (therefore the coefficient in the Mincer equation). An educational 
policy in which, for example, the amount of qualified labor rises more than 
proportionally, should lead to a lower price of this type of labor in a general equilibrium 
framework, which would create other effects on participation and labor earnings which 
are unaccounted for. 
Nevertheless, there are some reasons to think that these effects are not as important 
as it could be expected. On the one hand, the work that has attempted to include GE 
effects has shown that the results in this framework are not that different from the ones 
obtained in a partial equilibrium one
9. On the other, to predict GE effects, a very 
complex structural modeling should be developed, which requires more complete data 
than what is available for Colombia, as well as a very robust specification, since full 
structural models are strongly dependent on the assumptions made on the agents’ 
behavior and expectations. All of these given, in the case of this paper, an attempt on 
doing so would diminish the predictive power of the model and, therefore, the 
credibility of the results. 
Finally, there could be some doubts about the dependence of the results on the 
specification of the earnings equation or the data (year) used to estimate it. Thus, 
robustness checks including these kinds of variations are presented. 
 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Lee (2004) and Lee & Wolpin (2006).   13
7 Public Policy Experiments 
 
7.1 Schooling Distributions and Equation Estimations 
 
7.1.1 Educational Policies 
 
According to what has been stated so far, 6 schooling distributions are built in order 
to represent as many educational policies. One of them (egalitarian) does not represent 
a feasible educational policy. It is relevant, though, as a comparison and purely 
theoretical scenario. The remaining five share a basic characteristic, beside their 
feasibility: compared to the observed schooling distribution for 2004
10, all of them are 
strictly better in a Pareto sense.
11 Since the schooling distributions are built from the 
observed one, no individual is allowed to “loose” schooling years. Table 2 presents the 
educational policies and their corresponding schooling distributions. The column named 
distribution includes a brief description of each one and the way it was built. Figure 4 
shows histograms of all of the schooling distributions. 
 
Name Educational Policy Schooling distribution
Egalitarian D.N.A. (Theoretical and comparative 
purpose)
All observations have 9 years.
College 
subsidy
Full tuition subsidies until receiving a 
bachelor's degree, randomly assigned 
among those with schooling prerequisites 
(at least highschool).
20% of the observations with complete high 
school or incomplete college will now have 
complete college. Random assignment.
Un focalized To rise average schooling without any 
specific focalization.
All observations have their observed schooling 




To guarantee primary education 
(Colombian 5th grade) to all of the 
population.
Observations 12 or older with less than 5 years 




To guarantee high school (Colombian 11th 
grade) to all of the population.
Observations 18 or older with less than 11 
years of schooling will now have 11. Others 
remain unaltered.
Decennial The Decennial Education Plan (Plan 
Decenal de Educación) 2007 poses the 
following goals: Universal coverage until 
11th grade, 50% coverage in tertiary 
education adn 205 coverage in post 
graduate education.
Observations are randomly selected to fill in the 
empty places in the coverage goals. They are 
selected from the sample of observations which 
do not have the corresponding schooling. 
Table 2




7.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The selection of these policies attempts to include a wide range of possibilities, 
based broadly on their variance and the section of the density where most of the changes 
occur. Thus, egalitarian has no variance. College subsidy, on the other hand, has a very 
large one. Unfocalized makes the same (absolute) changes throughout the distribution. 
Universal primary focuses on the lower section, universal high school on the center and 
decennial on the upper section.  
                                                 
10 The schooling distributions are built from the observed one for 2004. 
11Under the assumption that more schooling is always preferred to less schooling or, in other words, that 
the marginal utility for an additional year of schooling is always positive within the relevant range.   14
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics of the counterfactual schooling 
distributions. All of the distributions but egalitarian have a higher mean than the 
observed one, which goes from 9 (egalitarian) to 13.7 (decennial). Standard deviation 




































Variation Median Min Max
E g a l i t a r i a n 9 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0999
College subsidy 9.564 4.569 0.478 10 0 21
Un focalized 11.064 3.947 0.357 12 2 21
Universal primary 9.640 3.848 0.399 10 5 21
Universal highschool 12.095 2.062 0.170 11 11 21






7.1.3 Labor Earnings Function 
  
Table 4 shows the most important coefficients of the Mincer equations, estimated 
with the 2004 data. These estimations have a purely statistical relevance in this paper. 

























































labor earnings. Since potential experience remains unaltered throughout the different 
distributions, the corresponding coefficients are irrelevant at this point. 
Each additional year of schooling will generate 7% more labor earnings, if the 
individual is a woman, and 5%, if he is a man. If that additional year takes the 
individual to “finish” high school, earnings would rise approximately 15% (for both 
genders). If he/she “finishes” college, labor earnings would be 52% larger (exp 
0.048+0.37) in the case of men, and 73% (exp. 0.07+0.48) in the case of women. 
Although the results are not reported, the Mincer equations are estimated with the 
1985 and 1995 data, too. The schooling coefficient is close to the one reported in papers 
with similar data and specifications (i.e. Núñez and Sánchez, 1998a) 
 
Variable
Schooling (years) 0.04876 *** 0.07044 ***
(0.0048) (0.0065)
College premia 0.37246 *** 0.48162 ***
(0.0396) (0.0442)
High school premia 0.10327 *** 0.07032 *
(0.0292) (0.0417)
Potential experience 0.03499 *** 0.03352 ***
(0.0021) (0.0031)
Potential experience  -0.00048 *** -0.00047 ***
(squared) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Total observations 21334 25845
Uncensored observations 12676 10523
Source: Author's calculations based on ECH 2004 III
Standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at the 10% level
*** Significant at the 1 % level
Occupation, marital status and city fixed effects included but not reported.
Selection bias is corrected with Heckman ML procedure.
Table 4
Labor earnings functions. 2004.
(corrected for selection bias)







Table 5 shows mean labor earnings, Gini coefficient and Theil index for each of the 
counterfactual earnings distributions. Table 6 ranks the distributions according to these 
criteria. A lower number in this ranking means a lower value in the results in Table 5. 
Figure 5 shows the results in terms of inequality (Gini and Theil). 
Even though the fit of the labor earnings function is good (the adjusted R –squared 
is somewhere near 50% in both cases), it is responsible to focus the analysis on 
comparative rather than absolute results. Thus, the main, but not only, element of 
analysis is the comparison between the counterfactual scenarios in terms of inequality, 
which, according to what has been stated in previous sections, is equivalent to 
establishing a comparison between the educational policies in this particular dimension.   16
As it could have been expected, the distribution with the lower inequality is the one 
that comes from the simulation of the egalitarian distribution. It is also illustrative, 
though expected, to see that egalitarian has the worst results in terms of mean earnings. 
Even if it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to underline the existing trade 
off between the reduction of inequality and the level of labor earnings. 
Universal high school is the best plausible policy in terms of inequality. Since this is 
a very similar policy, though a more ambitious one, to what was observed in Colombia 
during the last years (Figure 3), an optimist interpretation would be that what has been 
done would yield good results in the long run
12. On the other hand, the earnings 
distribution resulting from the college subsidy policy is the most unequal one. Thus, it 
could be concluded that investing in high qualification alone would lead to higher 
inequality, while doing so in medium qualification lead towards the opposite. 
 
Mean Gini Theil
Egalitarian 437188 0.28450 0.13011
College subsidy 620727 0.37855 0.23629
Un focalized 650563 0.35260 0.20439
Universal primary 585622 0.36229 0.21916
Universal highschool 657746 0.32625 0.17635
Decennial 848623 0.33881 0.18423







Egalitarian 6 1 1
College subsidy 4 6 6
Un focalized 3 4 4
Universal primary 5 5 5
Universal highschool 2 2 2
Decennial 1 3 3
* 1= highest value
** 1=lowest value






One of the most interesting results is the relative position of decennial. Right behind 
universal high school, it is the second best of the plausible policies. This is relevant for 
several reasons. First, decennial is a quite disperse schooling distribution. Second, the 
mean of the resulting earnings distribution is the highest, contradicting the trade off 
between level and inequality in labor earnings. Thus, by equalizing opportunities and 
high levels of investment in generating skilled labor, decennial achieves good results in 
terms if labor earnings inequality without any sacrifice in their level. Given the large 
earnings differential between skilled and unskilled labor, the ambitious goals in terms of 
tertiary education coverage lead to interesting results in term of inequality. It is 
straightforward to see why this raises mean earnings as well.  
                                                 
12 This result seems to be sensitive to how perfectly the objective is accomplished. For instance, when 1% 
desertion is allowed between high school grades, the Gini coefficient jumps to 0.34596. 



























Comparing this last result to the opposition between college subsidy and universal 
high school leads to a very important policy implication. Since decennial implies a large 
investment in high skilled labor, full coverage in high school and just a small rise in 
inequality compared to universal high school, the results suggest that investments in 
tertiary education could be made without large increases in inequality if high school 
coverage is previously guaranteed. 
Base on all of the above, a very preliminary comparison between two different paths 
towards a larger proportion of high skilled labor force can be posed. If universal 
primary is taken as a starting point, and a higher proportion of high skilled labor is 
taken as the final target, one path would be going straightly from one to the other 
(college subsidy). The other path would introduce an intermediate stage: full high 
school coverage. Thus, the resulting distribution would be decennial.  Based on the 
already mentioned results in terms of Gini coefficient, the second “path” would be 
definitively better than the first one. 
The un-focalized policy, as one could have expected, lands right in the middle of all 
of the rankings. This is quite interesting, though, since it highlights the importance of 
thinking about educational policy and the implications of the composition of the 
schooling distribution on the labor earnings distribution. It reinforces the assumption 
that composition does matter. 
 
7.3 The Participation Effect 
 
The results presented in the last section did not take into account the effect of the 
educational policies on labor force participation. As it was already mentioned, since 
schooling is involved in an individual’s decision of whether or not she offers labor in 
the market, educational policies could affect those decisions. Nevertheless, these effects 
were not included because doing so would require the unlikely and strong assumption 
that all of the increases in participation, no matter their magnitude, could be perfectly 
absorbed by the labor market.  
Results in Tables 5 and 6 rest on an equally strong assumption: participation 
remains unaltered by educational policies. Therefore, it is important and necessary, for 
comparison purposes, to present the results that are obtained when the participation   18
effect is included. These can be found in Tables 7 and 8, which are analogous to Tables 
5 and 6. 
Several points are worth noting. First, comparative results are identical. 
Nevertheless, the results are clearly weaker, in magnitude, when the participation effect 
is included. The distribution under which inequality is lower is still egalitarian with a 
Gini coefficient of 0.45, which strongly differs from the original 0.28 in Table 5. The 
range of the new Gini coefficients is also narrower. 
All of these can be basically explained by the positive coefficient of schooling in the 
participation equation. Many individuals who do not participate in the historical data 
will end up participating in the counterfactual scenarios, and this will be more frequent 
in the lower part of the schooling distribution.  Furthermore, since these individuals are 
also more likely to be in the lower part of the earnings distribution, inequality rises. 
Thus, the inclusion of the participation effect generates less variation among the 
resulting labor earnings distributions and higher overall inequality. The relative results 
do not change, though. Since the two assumptions (perfect absorption and constant 
participation) can be interpreted as the two extreme situations among an infinite range 
of scenarios, the quantitative results in Tables 5 and 7 could be understood as upper and 
lower bounds of the changes in inequality that would result from the implementation of 
the educational policies.  
 
Mean Gini Theil
Egalitarian 323,588 0.45036 0.33677
College subsidy 529,970 0.50485 0.50485
Un focalized 505,120 0.50294 0.42346
Universal primary 487,371 0.50434 0.42811
Universal highschool 510,290 0.47736 0.38264
Decennial 640,050 0.48199 0.38383
Table 7







Egalitarian 6 1 1
College subsidy 2 6 6
Un focalized 4 4 4
Universal primary 5 5 5
Universal highschool 3 2 2
D e c e n n i a l 133
* 1= highest value
** 1=lowest value
Table 8
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7.4 Robustness Checks 
 
Table 9 summarizes the results of some robustness checks
13.One could think of the 
results being driven by two kinds of unwanted elements: the year of the data from which 
the earnings and participation equations are estimated and the particular specification of 
the Mincer equation. Thus, the whole estimation and simulation process was repeated 
with four different variations. First, the earnings function was estimated with 1985 and 
1995 data. These years were selected in order to estimate the Mincer equation before 
(1985) and during (1995) the period of rising inequality in Colombia. The policy 
rankings, according to the Gini coefficient, are presented on columns 2 and 3 of Table 
10. Column 4 shows the results when age is included instead of potential experience in 
the earnings function. Finally, the results after including schooling levels instead of the 
schooling years and level premia in that same equation can be found in column 5. In 
order to allow an easy comparison, original results (from Table 6) are included in 
column 1. 
As it can be observed, comparative results are extremely robust. Not only they 
remain unaltered when the participation effect is included, but the same happens when 
the already mentioned changes are introduced in the estimation of the Mincer equation. 
The only case in which something different is obtained is when schooling levels are 
included instead of schooling years and premia in the Mincer equation. In this case, 
universal primary ranks 4
th, moving unfocalized to he 5
th position. This happens 
because all of the changes in universal primary lead to a change in schooling level, 
while most of the changes in unfocalized don’t. 
 
Baseline estimation 1985 Parameters 1995 Parameters Age Schooling levels
Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian Egalitarian
Universal highschool Universal highschool Universal highschool Universal highschool Universal highschool
Decennial Decennial Decennial Decennial Decennial
Un focalized Un focalized Un focalized Un focalized Universal primary
Universal primary Universal primary Universal primary Universal primary Un focalized
College subsidy College subsidy College subsidy College subsidy College subsidy






It is absolutely necessary to make explicit some of the limitations of the 
methodology that has been used. First, it is an absolutely static one. The way in which 
the participation decision is modeled, as it was widely discussed, is extremely simple. 
These led to unrealistic changes in participation decisions under some of the policies 
evaluated. For these reason, the main results were presented without the participation 
effect.  
Finally, all of the comparative analysis has not taken into account the different costs 
associated with each of the educational policies. Some of the best policies, according to 
the results, would probably represent a larger burden on public budget (i.e. decennial). 




                                                 
13 The participation effect is excluded in these exercises.   20
8 Conclusions 
 
Counterfactual labor earnings distributions were simulated. The only difference 
between them comes from the generation process, in which the schooling of individuals 
(hence the schooling distribution) was changed in order to represent some educational 
policies. A comparative analysis was established in terms of the inequality of the 
resulting earnings distributions. This allowed for comparison between the educational 
policies in this particular dimension. All of the process happens inside a partial 
equilibrium environment in which labor earnings are endogenous but relative prices 
remain unaltered. 
Guranteeing high school education to all of the population proves to be a really 
powerful tool in terms labor earnings inequality reduction. The results of this paper 
suggest that this should be done before attempting to do large investments in tertiary 
education coverage. When this happens, schooling distributions with relatively high 
variance can coexist with comparatively low levels of inequality and high mean 
earnings. On the other hand, failing to provide universal high school coverage before 
focusing on tertiary education leads to higher inequality. 
There is some evidence that the magnitude of the changes in inequality produced by 
the educational policies seems to be strongly dependant on the characteristics of the 
labor market. Inequality reductions appear to be quite larger when the labor market is 
not able to absorb the changes in participation generated by the shifts in the schooling 
distribution. Although it is far beyond the reach of this paper, this could imply that 
educational policy has a larger effect, in terms of inequality reduction, in weaker 
economies (such as the ones in developing countries). Research on this is strongly 
encouraged by these preliminary results. 
Are the results of this paper a precise prediction of the inequality that would arise 
from the execution of these educational policies? It would be irresponsible to say so. 
Nevertheless, they create useful elements for their comparison in this particular 
dimension, as well as clues on their interdependence with other elements. The main 
results are extremely robust to changes in equation specification and data used for the 
estimation. This allows rejecting the idea that they are driven by forces different from 
the educational policies. Thus, what has been presented in this paper must be interpreted 
as an initial step in the provision of decision elements for public policy, which has been 
produced through the use of a rigorous methodology. All of these should be 
complemented with research focusing on other dimensions of educational policy.   
“The history of interest among economists in the distribution of income is as long as 
the history of modern economics itself” (Becker and Chiswick, 1966 p.358). As long as 
inequality levels remain as high as they actually are, that interest would still exist. 
Educational policy is still a powerful tool in this sense. The results of this paper suggest 
the possibility of achieving some inequality reduction without any sacrifice in mean 
earnings (though probably at a very large cost). Nevertheless, educational policy is just 
one of the possible means to achieving a less unequal income distribution. The problem 
requires creative initiatives integrating simultaneous and complementary actions 
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